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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves school redistricting in Lower Merion, Pennsylvania and 
allegations that the implemented redistricting plan violates the Equal Protection Clause.  
Here, the Lower Merion School District (―the District‖) used pristine, non-discriminatory 
goals as the focal points of its redistricting plan, Plan 3R.  The District‘s goals included 
that: 
1. ―The enrollment of the two high schools and two middle schools will be 
equalized;‖ 
2. ―Elementary students will be assigned so that the schools are at or under the 
school capacity;‖ 
3. ―The plan may not increase the number of buses required;‖ 
4. ―The class of 2010 will have the choice to either follow the redistricting 
plan or stay at the high school of their previous year;‖ (referred to as 
―grandfathering‖) and 
5. ―Redistricting decisions will be based upon current and expected future 
needs and not based on past practices.‖ 
 
(App. at A16.)   
 
The District Court concluded that the District‘s assignment plan employing these 
goals required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but 
concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly.  
Upon review, we disagree with the District Court‘s determination that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate level of review, but we affirm the conclusion that the District‘s school 
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assignment plan is consonant with the Constitution.     
The Supreme Court and this Court have yet to set forth any standard requiring the 
application of strict scrutiny when decisionmakers have discussed race, but the school 
assignment plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose.  
We hold that the plan here passes constitutional muster because it does not select students 
based on racial classifications, it does not use race to assign benefits or burdens in the 
school assignment process, it does not apply the plan in a discriminatory manner, and it 
does not have a racially discriminatory purpose.  Strict scrutiny does not apply.  The 
appropriate test to determine the constitutionality of the District‘s school assignment plan 
is rational basis.  In our view, the District has met the rational basis test with its 
redistricting plan — Plan 3R.  We shall affirm the District Court‘s order.  
I. BACKGROUND 
The District operates six elementary schools (Belmont Hills, Cynwyd, Gladwyne, 
Merion, Penn Valley, and Penn Wynne); two middle schools (Bala Cynwyd and Welsh 
Valley); and two high schools (Harriton and Lower Merion High School (―LMHS‖)).  
The high schools are both ―ranked as being among the best in the state, if not the nation.‖  
(App. at A6.)  Nine elected School Directors (―Board members‖) comprise the Lower 
Merion Board of School Directors (―Board‖), which has the authority to assign Lower 
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Merion students to schools within the District.
2
  The District‘s Administration includes 
the District‘s Superintendent and several cabinet members.3   
In 1997, the District began a capital improvement program to modernize each 
District school.  In May 2004, a forty-five member Community Advisory Committee 
(―CAC‖) of school officials and community members investigated a plan to modernize 
the two high schools.  At the time, approximately 1600 students attended LMHS and 900 
students attended Harriton.  The CAC considered four proposals: (1) creating a separate 
school for grade nine only and another school for grades ten through twelve; (2) building 
one new high school that all high school students would attend; (3) building two new 
high schools to replace Harriton and LMHS with the same student populations as 
Harriton and LMHS; and (4) building two new high schools with 1,250 students enrolled 
at each school.   
The CAC rejected the first three proposals due to academic and logistical 
shortcomings.  The CAC voted in favor of the fourth proposal (building two high schools 
with equal student enrollment) because students would benefit from a stronger sense of 
                                                 
2
 During the January 2009 school redistricting process, the Board members were: Diane 
DiBonaventuro; Linda Doucette-Ashman; David Ebby, the President; Gary J. 
Friedlander; Susan Guthrie; H. Linda Kugel; Ted Lorenz; Gerald Gene Novick; and Lisa 
Pliskin. 
 
3
 Dr. Christopher McGinley was the District‘s Superintendent, beginning in June 2008, 
and Dr. Jamie P. Savedoff was his predecessor.  During the school redistricting process, 
Dr. McGinley‘s cabinet included Dr. Michael J. Kelly, Assistant Superintendent; Edward 
Andre, Director of Transportation; Scott A. Schafer, Business Manager; Pat Guinnane, 
Director of Human Resources; and Doug Young, Director of Public Relations. 
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community, better student-faculty interactions, and better educational outcomes.  The 
CAC also determined that this option would give students at both high schools the most 
equitable access to programs and facilities while securing the best use of both school 
sites.  This option would also alleviate traffic and parking problems near LMHS.   
The Board accepted the CAC‘s recommendation to equalize the student 
populations at the two high schools and chose to keep the schools at their existing 
locations because the District did not have other possible sites.  Equalizing student 
enrollment between the two schools would require redistricting because, under the prior 
plan, LMHS had 700 more students than Harriton.  Harriton, which is located farther 
from the center of the student population than LMHS, has always had a substantially 
lower enrollment than LMHS despite Harriton‘s magnet programs aimed at attracting 
more students.   
  Students Doe 1 through 9 (―Students‖) are African-American students who live 
in an area referred to as South Ardmore or the Affected Area, which is within the District.  
Ardmore, which is comprised of North Ardmore and South Ardmore, is a neighborhood 
in Lower Merion.  Six of the Parents Doe testified that they and their children live within 
a mile of LMHS and the District‘s Director of Transportation, Michael Andre, testified 
that at least three Students Doe live within a mile of LMHS.  Of the neighborhoods in the 
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District, the Affected Area and North Ardmore have the highest concentration of African-
American families.
4
   
Decades before this litigation, the District assigned students who lived in North 
Ardmore and the Affected Area to an elementary school in Ardmore.  After that 
elementary school was torn down, the District assigned students in North Ardmore and 
the Affected Area to five of the District‘s other elementary schools and the District 
provided bus service to those schools.  In the 1990s, the District reassigned students of 
North Ardmore and the Affected Area: North Ardmore students attended Penn Wynne 
Elementary School and Bala Cynwyd Middle School; Affected Area students attended 
Penn Valley Elementary School and Welsh Valley Middle School.  During that time, 
students in both North Ardmore and the Affected Area could choose to attend either 
Harriton High School or LMHS.   
Prior to the adoption of Plan 3R, the plan at issue here, students assigned to 
Belmont Hills, Gladwyne, and Penn Valley Elementary Schools would attend Welsh 
Valley Middle School and then would attend Harriton for high school, with the exception 
that students who lived in the Narberth Borough area, Haverford, and the Affected Area 
were assigned to LMHS.  Students assigned to Cynwyd, Merion, and Penn Wynne 
                                                 
4
 As of September 2008, the Affected Area had 308 students in kindergarten through 
twelfth grade (140 were white, 140 were African-American, 9 were Asian, and 18 were 
Hispanic) and North Ardmore had 167 students in kindergarten through twelfth grade (32 
were white, 107 were African-American, 12 were Asian, and 16 were Hispanic).  (App. 
at A10 n.2 (citing Plaintiff‘s Exhibit 154, ¶¶ 13–14).) 
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Elementary Schools would attend Bala Cynwyd Middle School and, then, were assigned 
to LMHS for high school.  All students assigned to LMHS could, instead, choose to 
attend Harriton.  Prior to redistricting, forty-six African-American students attended 
Harriton (5.7 percent of Harriton‘s total student population) and ten percent of the 
District‘s high school students were African-American.  (App. at A13.)   
The District has always provided bus service to students except those students who 
live in the ―walk zones‖ of the school that they attend.  Walk zones are the areas within a 
mile of District Schools.
5
  Students who live within a walk zone for their assigned school 
walk to school instead of receiving bus service.  The boundaries of the LMHS walk zone 
were selected in the late 1990s.  Because the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation 
declared that the street on which Harriton is located is hazardous for student walking, 
Harriton is the only school without a walk zone. 
A. Redistricting 
The redistricting process began in the summer of 2008 and ended on January 12, 
2009, when the Board adopted Proposed Plan 3R.  Initially, the Board authorized the 
Administration to develop proposed redistricting plans and to choose plans for the 
Board‘s consideration.  The Board also developed a list of ―Non-Negotiables‖ to guide 
                                                 
5
 The historic LMHS walk zone does not extend to all of the area within a mile of LMHS.  
Appellants have not challenged the constitutionality of the historic LMHS walk zone 
boundaries. 
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the redistricting process.
6
  On April 21, 2008, the Board adopted the following Non-
Negotiables: 
1. ―The enrollment of the two high schools and two middle schools will be 
equalized;‖ 
2. ―Elementary students will be assigned so that the schools are at or under the 
school capacity;‖ 
3. ―The plan may not increase the number of buses required;‖ 
4. ―The class of 2010 will have the choice to either follow the redistricting 
plan or stay at the high school of their previous year;‖ (referred to as 
―grandfathering‖) and 
5. ―Redistricting decisions will be based upon current and expected future 
needs and not based on past practices.‖ 
 
(Id. at A16.)   
In May 2008, the District hired two outside consultants, Dr. Harris Sokolov and 
Ellen Petersen, to compile a list of Lower Merion residents‘ values for the purpose of 
informing the redistricting process.  As a result of a series of public forums and a 
collection of online surveys from Lower Merion residents, information was gathered and 
all had an opportunity to participate. 
The consultants issued a report identifying the following ―Community Values‖: 
1. ―Social networks are at the heart of where people live, and those networks 
expand as people grow older;‖ 
2. ―Lower Merion public schools are known for their excellence: academic as 
well as extracurricular;‖ 
3. ―Those who walk should continue to walk while the travel time for non-
walkers should be minimized;‖ 
                                                 
6
 The Administration recommended several Non-Negotiables to the Board.  One of the 
Administration‘s suggestions was to address the ―distribution of minority students‖ and 
―racial balanc[ing].‖  (App. at A15.)  The Board did not accept this suggestion.   
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4. ―Children learn best in environments when they are comfortable — socially 
as well as physically;‖ and 
5. ―[E]xplore and cultivate whatever diversity — ethnic, social, economic, 
religious and racial — there is in Lower Merion.‖ 
 
(Id. at A17, n.9.)
7
     
In June 2008, the Board hired Dr. Ross Haber to review and analyze District 
enrollment data and to create redistricting plans called ―Scenarios.‖   
Dr. Haber prepared eight sets of Scenarios
8
 that were considered by the 
Administration, in the first instance.  Under the Scenarios, the projected enrollment for 
Harriton ranged from 1080 to 1195 and the projected enrollment for LMHS ranged from 
1137 to 1270.  Both the Affected Area and North Ardmore would be redistricted to 
Harriton in Scenarios 1, 2, and 5; the Affected Area, but not North Ardmore, would be 
redistricted to Harriton in Scenario 8; North Ardmore, but not the Affected Area, would 
be redistricted to Harriton in Scenarios 3, 4, and 7; and neither the Affected Area nor 
North Ardmore would be redistricted to Harriton in Scenario 4a.  No Scenario redistricted 
only the Affected Area to Harriton.  The percentage of students at each high school that 
would be African-American ranged from 4.4 percent to 14.5 percent under the Scenarios.  
                                                 
7
 Dr. Ross Haber, who developed the redistricting plans, testified that he was aware of 
and used the Community Values in developing the plans. 
 
8
 The Scenarios are numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, 5, 7, and 8.  No Scenario 6 was ever 
presented to the Administration. 
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Most Scenarios would yield a percentage of African–American students between 7 and 
10 percent.
9
  
Dr. Haber prepared informational handouts of the Scenarios for the 
Administration.  The handouts regarding Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 included the number 
of African-American students, but did not include any other racial/ethnic data or any data 
regarding socioeconomic status or disability.
10
  Dr. Haber reported data on race, ethnicity, 
and socioeconomic disability for Scenarios 4a, 7, and 8.  The summaries of the Scenarios 
on the District‘s website did not include the statements regarding the racial/ethnic 
numbers for each Scenario.  Dr. Haber testified
11
 that this information was probably 
reported because the Administration expressed concerns regarding African-American 
students and that he was never directed to create or change a Scenario based on diversity 
outcomes.
12
  A chart dated August 26, 2008 lists the African-American and 
                                                 
9
 The percentage of the Harriton student population that would be African-American is, 
in ascending order: Scenario 4a, 4.4 percent; Scenario 7, 7.8 percent; Scenarios 4 and 5, 
8.6 percent; Scenario 2, 9.3 percent; Scenario 8, 9.6 percent; Scenario 3, 9.9 percent; and 
Scenario 1, 14.5 percent. 
 
10
 On his personal set of the handouts, Dr. McGinley wrote by hand the projected 
African-American student populations for Scenarios 1, 2, and 3.  For Scenarios 3, 3a, 4, 
and 5, the African-American student projections appear under the heading ―racial 
balance.‖ 
 
11
 This refers to Dr. Haber‘s testimony on April 12, 2010 during the District Court bench 
trial. 
 
12
 Dr. McGinley was aware of the Supreme Court‘s decision in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (―Seattle‖), 
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socioeconomically disadvantaged population estimates for the Scenarios.
13
  The 
following day, the chart was updated to include additional, general diversity data.   
The Administration considered Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, and 5 before eliminating 
Scenarios 1 and 4a.  Drs. McGinley and Haber testified that Scenario 1 was ―eliminated 
due to inequitable racial balancing‖ — this Scenario redistricted both the Affected Area 
and North Ardmore to Harriton.  (Id. at A24.)  Additionally, Scenario 1 was eliminated 
because it violated the Non-Negotiable to equalize the high school population and it 
would result in longer travel times.  Scenario 4a was eliminated because it ―[d]oes not 
support the community value of diversity as does other scenarios.‖  (Id.)  Scenario 4a is 
the only considered Scenario that redistricted neither North Ardmore nor the Affected 
Area to Harriton.  Dr. McGinley crossed out his copy of the slide presenting diversity 
data under Scenario 4a and wrote, ―Don‘t present.‖  (Id. at A30.)  He also wrote, ―Say 
don‘t post,‖ next to the slide listing reasons for not selecting Scenario 4a.  (Id.) 
                                                                                                                                                             
and asked Dr. Haber how the case affected a redistricting plan that sent a portion of 
Ardmore students to Harriton. 
 
13
 Dr. McGinley wrote by hand on his personal copy of the chart the population for other 
racial and ethnic groups and the number of special needs students under Scenario 3.  
Additionally, on his copy of the chart, Dr. McGinley handwrote ―OK‖ next to the 
numbers of African-American students and socioeconomically disadvantaged students for 
Scenario 4b. 
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B. Proposed Plans 
i. Proposed Plan 1 
After considering Scenarios 1, 2, 3, 4, 4a, and 5, the Administration presented 
Proposed Plan 1, which was based on the Scenario 3 series, to the Board at a public 
meeting on September 8, 2008.  Under Proposed Plan 1, there was no redistricting at the 
elementary school level and high school districting was determined by where the student 
lived.  Under this plan, students remained with the same group of students from 
kindergarten through grade eight.  The projected student enrollment of Harriton was 1108 
and that of LMHS was 1137.  Under Proposed Plan 1, North Ardmore, along with all of 
Penn Wynne Elementary School and some areas of Penn Valley Elementary School, 
would be redistricted for Harriton while the Affected Area would be districted for LMHS.  
Proposed Plan 1 was projected to result in African-American students accounting for 9.9 
percent of Harriton‘s student population.  Any high school student could still choose to 
attend Harriton to enroll in the school‘s International Baccalaureate Program.14  Under 
the plan‘s grandfathering provision, all current high school students could choose to 
remain at the high school they attended when the plan went into effect.  
The slide show presentation for Proposed Plan 1 included a slide with student 
population information on race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and disability.  A press 
release regarding this plan initially included a sentence stating that enrollments would 
                                                 
14
 This is a specialized academic program for a limited number of students. 
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reflect ―balance with regard to students of various ethnic, socio-economic, and special 
needs backgrounds,‖ but that sentence was removed prior to publication.  (Id. at A29.)  
After Proposed Plan 1 was presented at the public meeting, the District did not include 
the number of African-American students that would attend each high school when it 
posted Dr. Haber‘s summaries of the Scenarios on the District‘s website.  Dr. McGinley 
had asked Doug Young, the Director of Public Relations, not to post that information.   
On September 19, 2008, Board Member Diane DiBonaventuro sent an email to 
Dr. McGinley explaining that people might have ―the perception that Harriton is 
completely homogenous,‖ attended by ―filthy [rich] spoiled white kids.‖  (Id. at A31.)  
She also stated that the Board should emphasize that it is not merely trying to increase 
Harriton‘s racial diversity and the Board ―should be selling both our schools to the 
community.‖  (Id.)   
Board Member David Ebby responded to an email from a concerned citizen by 
saying that ―diversity is looked at in total,‖ and that Dr. McGinley ―is not trying to use 
the diversity of the Penn Wynne elementary attendance area to benefit a homogenous 
group in the western end of the Township by making their school more diverse.‖  (Id.) 
After receiving comments regarding the plan, the Board rejected Proposed Plan 1 
because it resulted in excessive travel times for students. 
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ii. Proposed Plan 2 
After the Board rejected Proposed Plan 1, the Administration considered the 
Scenario 7 series.  Scenario 7C, which Dr. McGinley stated was ―more consistent with 
the non-negotiables and the community values,‖ was modified to become Proposed Plan 
2.  (Id. at 32.)  Under the plan, the projected student enrollment of Harriton was 1135 and 
that of LMHS was 1139.  Proposed Plan 2 determined high school districting based on 
where the student lived.  The only students who could choose which high school to attend 
were those districted for LMHS but who chose to attend Harriton to enroll in the school‘s 
IB program.  Under this plan, students remained with the same group of students from 
kindergarten through grade eight, then they were separated for high school.  Under 
Proposed Plan 2, North Ardmore, along with all of Penn Wynne Elementary School, 
some areas of Penn Valley Elementary School, Narberth Borough of Belmont Hills, and 
some areas of Merion, would be redistricted for Harriton while the Affected Area would 
be districted for LMHS.  Proposed Plan 2 was projected to result in African-American 
students accounting for 7.8 percent of Harriton‘s student population.   
On October 28, 2008, Proposed Plan 2 was presented at a Board meeting open to 
the public.  Instead of adopting Proposed Plan 2, the Board asked Petersen and Dr. 
Sokolov, who had compiled a report of the Community Values in May 2008, to reassess 
the factors that were important to the community in a redistricting plan.  During this 
period of time, the Board thought that the community‘s primary concern was educational 
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continuity in terms of keeping students who attended the same kindergarten together at 
the same elementary, middle, and high schools through grade twelve.  The Board also 
identified additional goals of distance, access, and walkability.   
iii. Proposed Plan 3 
Next, the Administration developed Scenario 8, which would later become 
Proposed Plan 3.
15
  Before Proposed Plan 3 was selected and presented publicly, all of 
the Board members saw Scenario 8 and some individual Board members discussed race 
when speaking to others about potential proposals.
16
 
                                                 
15
 At this point in the redistricting process, Dr. Haber‘s role was substantially diminished. 
 
16
 Dr. McGinley sent a memorandum to the Board stating that a proposal developed by 
some parents ―creates a racially isolated group of African American Students at 
Harriton.‖  (App. at A35.)  He noted that it ―adds travel distance to several areas.‖  (Id.)  
On November 6, 2008, Board member Lisa Pliskin emailed Dr. McGinley, stating 
that she might want to see more of the diversity data for the plan.  Diane DiBonaventuro 
prepared a document with a new proposal and indicated that her proposal would lead to a 
problem of ―a larger population of minority students‖ at LMHS and that she would work 
racial diversity into an adopted plan if she could.   
On November 20, 2008, Dr. McGinley sent an email to Pliskin stating that he was 
―concerned about the Ardmore side of the map‖ and the ―achievement gap.‖  (Id. at A36.)  
He continued that he ―wish[ed] there was a way to extend the option area into the 
[Affected Area] but doing so would not only mean another hundred at [LMHS] but many 
fewer A[frican]-A[merican] kids at [Harriton].‖  (Id.)  Pliskin responded, ―You are not 
alone in trying to solve Ardmore.  I look at it every day and I know others would like to 
resolve it as well . . . . Can we open 100 tuition paying spots and would folks take them in 
this economy . . . and what happened to no racial isolation?‖  (Id.) 
Board Member David Ebby sent Dr. McGinley an email stating that ―redistricting 
is an opportunity . . . to end the stereotyping of Harriton as an inferior school populated 
by elitists and racists.‖  (Id. at A37.) 
DiBonaventuro sent Dr. McGinley an email about an alternative proposal she 
developed, noting that her proposal had ―a larger population of minority students‖ at 
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On November 24, 2008, Proposed Plan 3 was presented at a public Board meeting.  
Under the plan, the projected student enrollment of Harriton was 1089 and that of LMHS 
was 1185.  Proposed Plan 3 determined high school districting based on where the 
student lived.  The Affected Area, along with Narberth Borough of Belmont Hills and all 
areas of Penn Valley Elementary School except an abbreviated LMHS walk zone, would 
be redistricted for Harriton while North Ardmore would be districted for LMHS.  The 
students who lived in the abbreviated LMHS walk zone could choose to attend either 
high school.  The only other students who could choose their high school were those who 
were districted for LMHS, but who chose to attend Harriton to enroll in the school‘s IB 
program.  Proposed Plan 3 was projected to result in African-American students 
accounting for 9.6 percent of Harriton‘s student population.   
Proposed Plan 3 was a ―3-1-1 Feeder Pattern,‖ which sends the students districted 
for three elementary schools to attend a single middle school and a single high school.  
Under Proposed Plan 3, students districted for Cynwyd, Merion, and Penn Wynne 
Elementary Schools were districted to Bala Cynwyd Middle School and Lower Merion 
High School.  Students districted for Belmont Hills, Gladwyne, and Penn Valley 
Elementary Schools were districted to Welsh Valley Middle School and Harriton High 
                                                                                                                                                             
LMHS, but that ―expanding the choice to include the [Affected Area] may help a little.‖  
(Id.)  DiBonaventuro also sent an email to Dr. McGinley entitled ―African American 
students,‖ which stated that she was ―struggling with the issue of where to place the 
[Affected Area] kids‖ because there were compelling arguments for districting them to 
LMHS, but she ―worr[ied] about the kids that would become somewhat isolated at 
Harriton without a higher population.‖  (Id. at A37–38.) 
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School.  Under this plan, students remained with the same group of students from 
kindergarten through grade twelve.  
Students in the Affected Area would travel eighteen to nineteen minutes by bus to 
attend Harriton.  That ride is half the distance and half the time of the longest bus ride in 
the District.  The slideshow for the presentation of Plan 3 included diversity data. 
The Board‘s understanding of community members‘ concerns regarding Proposed 
Plan 3 was that there was a walkability issue due to the abbreviated LMHS walk zone.  In 
response, the Board decided to revise the proposal to become Proposed Plan 3R, which 
restored the LMHS walk zone to the non-abbreviated LMHS walk zone area.   
iv. Proposed Plan 3R 
The main difference between Proposed Plan 3R and Proposed Plan 3 is that Plan 
3R expanded Plan 3‘s abbreviated LMHS walk zone to the LMHS walk zone‘s historical 
boundaries.  The historic LMHS walk zone did not include the Affected Area and it did 
not have a high concentration of African-American students.  Under Proposed Plan 3R, 
all students assigned to LMHS and all students in the historic walk zone can choose to 
attend either high school.  Students assigned to Harriton who do not live within the 
LMHS walk zone do not have the option of attending LMHS.  Plan 3R still followed the 
3-1-1 Feeder Pattern with students in the Affected Area, along with Narberth Borough of 
Belmont Hills and all areas of Penn Valley Elementary School except the historic LMHS 
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walk zone, redistricted for Harriton and North Ardmore districted for LMHS.
17
  Plan 3R 
also included a grandfathering provision that allowed students who had already begun 
attending high school to choose to stay at that high school, even if they were assigned to 
the other high school under Plan 3R.   
On December 15, 2008, Proposed Plan 3R was presented at a public Board 
meeting.  Dr. McGinley testified that it was impossible to know the diversity data for 
Plan 3R because the grandfathering provision allowed so many students to choose to 
attend either high school.
18
  Drs. McGinley and Haber exchanged emails regarding how 
to discuss the role of race in the redistricting process.
19
  The presentation for Plan 3R did 
                                                 
17
 Plan 3R‘s 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern was the same as Plan 3‘s: students districted for 
Cynwyd, Merion, and Penn Wynne Elementary Schools were districted to Bala Cynwyd 
Middle School and LMHS.  Students districted for Belmont Hills, Gladwyne, and Penn 
Valley Elementary Schools were districted to Welsh Valley Middle School and Harriton. 
 
18
 If students attend the schools to which they are assigned under Plan 3R, one would 
expect the student populations of the school to be similar to those of Proposed Plan 3, 
where the projected student enrollment of Harriton was 1089, the projected enrollment of 
LMHS was 1185, and Harriton was projected to have a student enrollment that was 
approximately 9.6 percent African-American. 
 
19
 Dr. Haber emailed Dr. McGinley, stating that 
[t]he issue of race is still out front.  I think it is important to 
emphasize that you hired a consultant who had no horse in 
this race and the charge was simply to balance the 
enrollments at the high school. . . . We not only considered 
race when considering diversity but also socio-economic 
status as well as special needs considerations. 
(App. at A44.)  Dr. Haber testified that discussion of diversity focused on African-
American students because the African-American students were ―more concentrated‖ 
geographically.  (Id.) 
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not include any diversity data.  Hours before the Board‘s vote on Plan 3R, Dr. McGinley 
emailed to the Board projected Plan 3R enrollment data for race and ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and disability.  Dr. McGinley testified that he sent these 
projections in response to a flyer that alleged the plan was ―artificially designed to create 
token diversity at Harriton.‖  (Id. at A45.)  Dr. McGinley explained in the email that he 
did not agree with the flyer and stated that ―[t]he community value of diversity is what 
caused us to look at this issue in the process.  This was clearly misinterpreted in the 
public and the press.‖  (Id. at A46.)  Dr. McGinley continued that, of the 214 students 
who would be redistricted to Harriton, the 45 African-American students made up 21 
percent of those students who would be redistricted under Plan 3R.
20
  (Id.)   
On January 12, 2009, the Board voted to adopt Plan 3R.  Six Board members 
voted in favor of the plan, David Ebby and Diane DiBonaventuro voted against the plan, 
and then-Board President Lisa Pliskin indicated that she supported the plan, but could not 
vote because she was hospitalized.  All of the Board members testified that they did not 
cast their vote or give their support based on race.  Four of the Board members who 
supported the plan stated they did so primarily because they believed that the educational 
continuity of the 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern provided substantial benefits.  Six of the Board 
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 Dr. McGinley testified at trial that he no longer believed that there was a way to 
estimate enrollment at Harriton and he no longer believed the projections in the email 
were accurate. 
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members who supported the plan indicated they did so due to the plan‘s educational 
benefits and the Administration‘s support for the plan.21   
Diane DiBonaventuro, who voted against Plan 3R, sent Dr. McGinley an email 
stating that Proposed Plan 3R created an ―additional stressor‖ for African-American 
students by ―asking Ardmore kids to take one for the team,‖ when there ―just aren‘t a lot 
of A[frican]-A[merican] families.‖  (Id. at A48.)  DiBonaventuro stated that she did not 
think it was ―worth it‖ to redistrict Ardmore in order to ―marginally increase diversity.‖  
(Id.)  She testified that she wanted students in the Affected Area to be able to choose 
which high school to attend because they live within walking distance from LMHS. 
David Ebby, who voted against Plan 3R, testified that he did so because he 
considered the Affected Area and North Ardmore to be one community and he believed 
that the 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern and educational continuity allows ―stagnation‖ by not 
mixing students from different areas in the District.  (Id. at A49.)  Ebby testified that he 
did not believe race was ―at all relevant‖ in the redistricting process.  (Id.)     
                                                 
21
 Board member Susan Guthrie, who voted in favor of the plan, made a chart of her 
opinions on each of the Proposed Plans.  Under the chart headings ―keeps Community 
together,‖ Guthrie noted that Plans 1, 2, and 3 split Ardmore, ―minimize[] [b]us time and 
―preserve[] [w]alkers,‖ and provide for educational continuity.  (App. at A47–48.)  Under 
a ―Diversity Ardmore‖ heading, she wrote ―Yes Divides‖ for Proposed Plans 1 and 2, 
wrote ―Depends Divides, but with choice?‖ for Proposed Plan 3, and wrote ―Yes Yes‖ for 
Proposed Plan 3R.  (Id. at A47.)   
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C. Developments After Redistricting 
Plan 3R was implemented beginning with the 2009–2010 school year.  During that 
year, the impact of redistricting was unclear because grandfathering was allowed.  For 
2009–2010, Harriton had a student enrollment of 897 students: according to the District‘s 
records, 740 are white, 74 are African-American, 55 are Asian-American, 23 are 
Hispanic-American, 5 are American Indian, and 5 are more than one race.  Twenty-one 
students from the Affected Area were redistricted to Harriton, fourteen of whom were 
African-American.  Twenty-three students from areas districted for Penn Valley 
Elementary School were also redistricted to Harriton, none of whom were African-
American.  Less than one-third of the students redistricted were African-Americans from 
the Affected Area.    
D. Students Doe Bring Lawsuit 
On May 14, 2009, Students Doe 1 through 9, by and through their 
Parents/Guardians Doe 1 through 20, filed a complaint alleging that the District 
discriminated against them based on their race by adopting Plan 3R, which assigned 
Students Doe to Harriton.  For the 2009–2010 academic year, Student Doe 4 chose to 
attend Harriton and all other Students Doe attended Penn Valley Elementary School or 
Welsh Valley Middle School.   
Appellants allege that the District violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
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U.S.C. § 2000d, all pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by discriminating against the Students 
Doe based on their race.   
The District Court denied the District‘s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, 
for a More Definite Statement.  Appellants moved for preliminary injunctive relief, 
seeking to restore their ability to choose to attend either high school, but they 
subsequently withdrew the request.  After oral argument, on February 24, 2010, the 
District Court denied the District‘s Motion for Summary Judgment.   
Appellants and the District filed numerous Motions in Limine, including the 
Appellants‘ Motion in Limine to Preclude the Trial Testimony of Drs. Claudia Lyles and 
Robert Lee Jarvis because the District had not identified these witnesses during the 
course of discovery.
 22
  The District Court granted the Appellants‘ Motion to Proceed 
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 Before the District Court, Appellants filed a brief supporting the motion and Appellees 
filed a brief opposing the motion.  Appellants objected to the testimony of Drs. Lyles and 
Jarvis, who did not participate in the redistricting process, but who had worked with Dr. 
McGinley and had personal knowledge of his work.  Appellants objected to the testimony 
of Drs. Lyles and Jarvis because: (1) the District did not identify the witnesses to the 
plaintiff in advance of discovery, thereby allegedly violating Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(a), and (2) the District failed to timely supplement its disclosure upon 
discovery of additional information, thereby allegedly violating Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(e).  Appellants also argued that the District sought to depose these 
witnesses in order to introduce a new defense that the District had waived by asserting 
other ―mutually exclusive‖ defenses.  Appellants argued that allowing the District to, 
thus, ―change the focus of its case‖ constituted a ―trial by ambush.‖  Appellants offer no 
case law to support their argument. 
Appellants also sought to exclude the testimony of Anthony Stevenson and Wanda 
Anderson, but the objection to these witnesses is not at issue on appeal.  The District 
intended to solicit testimony from Stevenson and Anderson regarding their knowledge of 
Dr. McGinley‘s work regarding the achievement gap and diversity issues. 
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Pseudonymously,
23
 but denied the Motions in Limine without prejudice.  During trial, the 
District Court denied the renewed motion to preclude testimony of Drs. Claudia Lyles 
and Robert Lee.  The District Court held a nine-day bench trial.   
E. District Court Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
i. District Court Findings of Fact 
After the close of testimony on May 3, 2010, the District Court held oral argument 
on the parties‘ proposed findings of fact and, on May 13, 2010, the District Court issued a 
Memorandum on Factual Findings.  In addition to the findings of fact indicated above, 
the District Court found that the District had a ―race-neutral goal of equalizing the student 
enrollment at the two high schools‖ and that legitimate factors24 motivated the 
Administration‘s action.  The District Court noted that ―racial considerations were one of 
several motivating factors that resulted in the Administration‘s development of various 
plans,‖ including the recommendation to adopt Plan 3R.25  (Id. at A54.)  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
23
 Thereafter, Appellants were referred to as Students Doe 1–9 and Parents Doe 1–10 
instead of being referred to by their actual names. 
24
 Legitimate factors that the District Court referenced include: ―helping students attain 
educational excellence, attaining equal student populations at the two high schools, 
minimizing travel time, developing the 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern, and also closing the 
achievement gap that the Administration perceived to exist between African–American 
and white students.‖  (App. at A51.)  Additionally, the District Court concluded that the 
Non-Negotiables are all valid, educational purposes that are legitimate and non-
discriminatory.   
 
25
 The District Court determined that the Scenarios are of minor importance to this 
litigation because the four Board members who attended the Administration meeting 
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consideration of race ―went above and beyond collecting or reporting general diversity 
data‖ and the evidence reflected a specific concern about the African-American student 
population throughout the redistricting process.  (Id.)  The District Court found that ―the 
Administration plainly allowed racial consideration to influence what neighborhoods 
would be assigned to attend Harriton High School, without the choice to attend Lower 
Merion High School.‖  (Id. at A52.)  The District Court continued, opining that the 
Affected Area was ―targeted‖ for redistricting to Harriton, in part, because it has a high 
concentration of African-American students.  According to the District Court, the 
Administration‘s ―intent was to achieve not only overall numeric equality, but also racial 
parity, between the two schools.‖  (Id. at A53.)   
The District Court rejected any allegation of invidious discrimination toward 
African-American students by the Administration or the Board.  Moreover, the District 
Court noted that there were valid educational reasons for recommending and adopting 
Plan 3R, but that there was also a desire for racial diversity in both high schools.  The 
District Court found that providing information at the public Board meetings for the 
Proposed Plans regarding race/ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and disability was not 
objectionable.  The District Court found that some of the Board members considered 
diversity among other factors when considering Proposed Plans, but the Court also found 
                                                                                                                                                             
where the Scenarios were presented do not recall the Scenarios and the Scenarios were 
never presented to, nor voted upon by, the whole Board. 
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credible the Board members‘ testimony that race was not the basis of their votes on Plan 
3R.
26
 
ii. District Court Conclusions of Law 
On June 24, 2010, the District Court issued a Memorandum on Conclusions of 
Law.  The Court stated that the central issue in this case is whether the District‘s 
―targeting‖27 of the Affected Area for redistricting to Harriton, ―in part because that 
community has one of the highest concentrations of African-American students in the 
District,‖ violates the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.  (App. 
at A65.)   
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to this equal protection 
challenge, the District Court concluded that Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (―Seattle‖); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 
515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988) 
(―Croson‖); and Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) are not controlling here.  The 
District Court held that the level of scrutiny applied in Seattle, Grutter, Gratz, Adarand, 
Croson, and Johnson is inapposite here.  Specifically, strict scrutiny as applied in Seattle, 
                                                 
26
 The District Court concluded that Susan Guthrie and Diane DiBonaventuro considered 
race or diversity as a factor. 
 
27
 The District Court describes this as including ―a particular geographic area [to be 
redistricted] due to its racial makeup.‖  (App. at A67.) 
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Grutter, Gratz, Adarand, Croson, and Johnson is not required here because each of those 
cases involves a policy that employs express, individual racial classifications, whereas 
Plan 3R does not.  Plan 3R assigns students based on the neighborhood in which they 
reside without using individual racial classifications.  The District Court noted that Plan 
3R is a facially neutral redistricting plan with facially neutral guidelines, so, unlike the 
cases above, the action brought by Appellants does not ―involve the ‗additional 
difficulties posed by policies that, although facially race neutral, [may] result in racially 
disproportionate impact and [may be] motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.‘‖  
(App. at A76 (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213).) 
The District Court found, however, that the reasoning of  Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and 
Pryor v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002), 
nonetheless require Plan 3R to be reviewed under strict scrutiny.  The District Court 
interpreted the Pryor holding that, ―a discriminatory purpose based on race‖ requires 
strict scrutiny analysis, Pryor, 288 F.3d at 562 (emphasis added), to mean that, ―once race 
has been shown to be a motivating factor in decisionmaking, all racial classifications 
must survive strict scrutiny.‖ (App. at A76 (emphasis added)).  The District Court noted 
that it is unclear whether Pryor requires the application of strict scrutiny to student 
assignment plans that do not involve individual racial classifications. 
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In its analysis of Arlington Heights, the District Court interpreted the Supreme 
Court‘s holding that, ―[w]hen there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has been a 
motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial deference is no longer justified,‖ Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66 (emphasis added), to mean that such deference is no longer 
justified when ―race was a motivating factor.‖  (App. at A78 (emphasis added).)  The 
District Court noted that, under Arlington Heights, a court must ―conduct a sensitive 
inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available‖ to 
determine whether ―invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.‖  (App. at 
A78 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266) (emphasis added).)   
The District Court referenced its own rejection of ―any allegation[] of invidious 
discrimination . . . by the Administration or the Board.‖  (App. at A79 (quoting Doe II, 
2010 WL 1956585, at *28).)  However, the District Court held that ―the Affected Area‘s 
high concentration of African-American students factored into the District‘s adoption of 
Plan 3R‖ and, thus, ―racial demographics . . . factored into the District‘s recommendation 
that the Board adopt the Plan.‖  (App. at A80.)  The District Court held that, because 
―race was a motivating factor during redistricting,‖ it must determine ―whether plan 3R 
would have been adopted regardless of the racial composition of the Affected Area.‖  (Id. 
at A80.)  The District Court also noted that ―no congressional statute or Supreme Court 
precedent expressly provides that mere consideration of a neighborhood‘s racial 
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demographics in assigning students to schools constitutes decisionmaking in which race 
has been a motivating factor.‖  (Id. at A80 n.8.)   
Before embarking on a strict scrutiny review of Plan 3R, the District Court noted 
that, if the plan survived strict scrutiny, it would necessarily survive intermediate scrutiny 
or rational basis review.  Because Plan 3R is the only plan that meets the District‘s 
―compelling educational interests‖ of ―(a) equalizing the populations at the two high 
schools, (b) minimizing travel time and transportation costs, (c) fostering educational 
continuity, and (d) fostering walkability,‖ the District Court held that Plan 3R is narrowly 
tailored and survives strict scrutiny.  (Id. at A83.)  The District Court held that ―the mere 
fact that the District considered racial demographics . . . does not render the District‘s 
adoption of Plan 3R unconstitutional‖; ―Plan 3R would still have been adopted even had 
racial demographics not been considered.‖  (Id. at A92–93.)  The District Court held that 
the adoption of Plan 3R comports with the Equal Protection Clause.  Because the 
prohibitions of Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against discrimination are coextensive with 
the Equal Protection Clause, the District Court held that the Appellants‘ remaining claims 
must also fail.  On June 25, 2010, the District Court entered judgment in favor of the 
District. 
Students Doe filed a timely Motion for a New Trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59, but the District Court ruled against the Motion on August 19, 2010.   
Students Doe filed a timely appeal.
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
This Court has jurisdiction to review final decisions of the District Court, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the District Court‘s conclusions of law de novo and we review its 
findings of fact for clear error.  Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 
2010) (citing McCutcheon v. Am.‘s Servicing Co., 560 F.3d 143, 147 (3d Cir. 2009)). 
A district court‘s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007).  The District Court‘s interpretation of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is, however, subject to plenary review.  United States v. 
Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 ―Article III of the Constitution restricts the ‗judicial power‘ of the United States to 
the resolution of cases and controversies.‖  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United 
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982).  To satisfy the Article III 
case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff must establish that he or she has suffered an 
―injury in fact‖ that is both ―concrete and particularized‖ and ―actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.‖  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  In the equal protection context, an injury resulting 
from governmental racial discrimination ―accords a basis for standing only to those 
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persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged discriminatory 
conduct.‖  United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
   
―[O]ne form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to 
compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff.‖  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 
719.  Appellants have asserted an injury by alleging that Plan 3R is such a system.  (See 
App. at A137 (Appellants allege in their complaint that Plan 3R ―discriminates against 
Students Doe on the basis of race by mandating that said students attend Harriton High 
School because they are minorities‖ and ―it imposes an undue burden on minority 
students‖).)  That Students Doe have not alleged that, when they attend high school, they 
will want to attend LMHS instead of Harriton is irrelevant for purposes of standing.  In 
Seattle, the Supreme Court held that the possibility of a child being assigned to that 
child‘s preferred school under the race-based plan at issue did ―not eliminate the injury 
claimed.‖  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 718–19.  Because the children in Seattle lived in the 
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 In Allen, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing in a suit 
against the Internal Revenue Service for its grant of tax exempt status to racially 
exclusive private schools, because, in part, the plaintiffs did not allege ―that their children 
had ever applied or would ever apply for admission to any private school.‖  Allen, 468 
U.S. at 746.  Plaintiffs maintained that they had ―no interest whatever in enrolling their 
children in a private school.‖  Wright v. Regan, 656 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  
Student Doe would be analogous to Allen if Students Doe had alleged that they did not 
intend to enroll in either public high school in the District.  Students Doe, however, live 
within the District and attend the District‘s elementary, middle, or high schools.  Thus, 
Allen is not controlling even though Students Doe have not alleged that they will attend 
LMHS if given the choice.  Students Doe allege an injury in fact because they claim that 
they are being forced to compete in a race-based system. 
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district and attended elementary, middle, and high schools in the district, they asserted an 
imminent injury that was not speculative by claiming that they were ―being forced to 
compete in a race-based system that may prejudice‖ them.  Id.  Similar to the children in 
Seattle, Students Doe live within the District, attend District schools, and assert that the 
District is discriminating against them by assigning them to a school on the basis of race.  
Students Doe have asserted an injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical.
29
 
A.  Equal Protection Clause 
i. Level of Scrutiny 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State 
shall ―deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.‖  U.S. 
Const. amend. XIV, § 2.  The central purpose of the Clause ―is to prevent the States from 
purposely discriminating between individuals on the basis of race.‖  Shaw v. Reno, 509 
U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)).  A 
government action does not necessarily purposely discriminate merely because it is race-
related.  Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 538 (1982) (―a distinction may exist 
between state action that discriminates on the basis of race and state action that addresses, 
in neutral fashion, race-related matters. . . . the Equal Protection Clause is not violated by 
the mere repeal of race-related legislation or policies that were not required by the 
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 That Student Doe 4 chose to attend Harriton does not render his claim moot because 
Student Doe 4 alleges the same injury as the other students — being assigned to a school 
under a discriminatory race-based system. 
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Federal Constitution‖).  Thus, ―[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is 
required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.‖  Antonelli v. New Jersey, 
419 F.3d 267, 274 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. 
Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 (2003)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted 
in Antonelli).   
Precedent in this Court and the Supreme Court has established that 
Intentional discrimination can be shown when: (1) a law or 
policy explicitly classifies citizens on the basis of race, see 
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); (2) a facially neutral 
law or policy is applied differently on the basis of race, see 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); or (3) a facially 
neutral law or policy that is applied evenhandedly is 
motivated by discriminatory intent and has a racially 
discriminatory impact, see Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).   
 
Antonelli, 419 F.3d at 274.  Similarly, in Equal Protection Clause cases, we apply strict 
scrutiny to actions with racially discriminatory purpose: (1) ―all racial classifications 
imposed by government,‖ Grutter, 539 U.S. at 32730; (2) policies or laws that are applied 
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 See also Seattle, 551 U.S. at 720 (K-12 education) (―It is well established that when the 
government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial 
classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny.‖ (citing Johnson v. 
California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
224))); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 271 (university admissions) (―It is by now well established that 
‗all racial classifications reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly 
scrutinized.‘‖ (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224)); Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 (―We have 
held that ―all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a 
reviewing court under strict scrutiny.‖ (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227) (alteration in 
original)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (holding that ―all racial classifications, imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing 
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differently on the basis of race, see Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356; or (3) policies or laws for 
which ―a plaintiff establishes a discriminatory purpose based on race,‖ Pryor, 288 F.3d at 
562.
31
  However, ―absent a racially discriminatory purpose, explicit or inferable, on the 
part of the [decisionmaker], the statutory distinction is subject only to rational basis 
review.‖  United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256; Davis, 426 U.S. 229).
32
 
                                                                                                                                                             
court under strict scrutiny‖); Pers. Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) 
(―A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and 
can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.‖ (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964))); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
291 (university admissions) (―Racial and ethnic classifications . . . are subject to stringent 
examination without regard to [the discreteness and insularity of the persons being 
classified].‖). 
 
31
 See also Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66 (―when there is proof that a 
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial 
deference is no longer justified‖). 
 
32
 ―If state action does not burden a fundamental Constitutional right or target a suspect 
class, the ‗challenged classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably conceivable 
state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.‘‖  Doe v. 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993)).  
In its Memorandum on Conclusions of Law, the District Court referenced Justice 
Kennedy‘s concurrence in Seattle, in which Justice Kennedy notes that strict scrutiny is 
unlikely to apply to race conscious measures that do employ racial classifications.  The 
District Court, however, did not determine whether that concurrence is binding under 
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 
682 (3d Cir. 1991).  In their amicus brief, the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational 
Fund, Inc., the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union Foundation, amicus curiae, urge this Court to treat Justice Kennedy‘s 
concurrence in Seattle as binding. 
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1. Scrutiny Inquiry 
a. Intentional Discrimination Shown by Racial 
Classification 
The first alternative, a classification based explicitly on race, ―is presumptively 
invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification.‖  Crawford, 458 U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Marks, the Supreme Court held that, ―[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case 
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‗the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.‘‖  430 U.S. at 193 (quoting Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15); see also Casey, 947 F.2d at 693 (noting that Marks 
stands for the proposition that ―the controlling opinion in a splintered decision is that of 
the Justice or Justices who concur on the ―narrowest grounds‖), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).   
In Seattle, the Chief Justice and four other Justices, including Justice Kennedy, 
agreed that racial classifications in the assignment plans at issue in that case required the 
application of strict scrutiny and that the plans did not survive strict scrutiny.  Seattle, 551 
U.S. at 720, 733–35.  These portions of Chief Justice Roberts‘s opinion constitute the 
opinion of the Court and, thus, there is a ―single rationale explaining the result [that] 
enjoys the assent of five Justices.‖  Neither Marks nor Casey governs the level of 
deference required by Justice Kennedy‘s concurring opinion in Seattle.  Justice 
Kennedy‘s proposition that strict scrutiny is ―unlikely‖ to apply to race conscious 
measures that do not lead to treatment based on classification does not ―explain[] the 
result‖ of Seattle.  The result of Seattle was the holding that the two assignment plans at 
issue employed race-based classifications and failed strict scrutiny, but Justice Kennedy‘s 
proposition pertains to assignment plans that do not require strict scrutiny because they 
do not employ race-based classifications.  The portion of Justice Kennedy‘s concurrence 
discussing race-conscious measures is not binding because it is dicta; it refers to 
hypothetical facts and is not material to the result of Seattle. 
As has occurred on other occasions with some other non-binding rationales, a 
future plurality or majority of the Court could adopt Justice Kennedy‘s rationale for race-
conscious, non-discriminatory school assignments to give it precedential effect.  See 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (―today we endorse Justice Powell‘s view 
[from his Bakke concurrence] that student body diversity is a compelling state interest 
that can justify the use of race in university admissions‖).  Because the Supreme Court 
has not yet given its imprimatur to the propositions in Justice Kennedy‘s Seattle 
concurrence, it is not yet the law of the Supreme Court or binding on this Court. 
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at 536–37 (1982) (citing Pers. Adm‘r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)); see 
also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213.  Thus, ―when the government distributes burdens or 
benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under 
strict scrutiny.‖33  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 720 (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 
505–06 (2005); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224).  ―The term racial 
classification ‗normally refers to a governmental standard, preferentially favorable to one 
race or another, for the distribution of benefits.‘‖  Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of 
Boston, 375 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811, 1 (1998)).  ―A statute or policy utilizes a ‗racial 
classification‘ when, on its face, it explicitly distinguishes between people on the basis of 
some protected category.‖  Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1999). 
Plan 3R is facially race neutral, assigning students to schools based only on the 
geographical areas in which they live.  The Plan, on its face, neither uses racial 
classification as a factor in student assignment nor distributes any burdens or benefits on 
the basis of racial classification.  The lack of racial classification in Plan 3R distinguishes 
Plan 3R from the policies in every Supreme Court equal protection education case upon 
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 The standard of review ―is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by 
a particular classification.‖  Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of 
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279–80 (plurality opinion); id. at 285–86 (O‘Connor, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
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which Appellants rely in their brief
34
 — in this manner, Plan 3R starkly differs from the 
policies at issue in Seattle, Gratz, Grutter, Bakke, Brown, McLaurin v. Oklahoma State 
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
35
  In each of 
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 The District Court frequently distinguished Plan 3R from other equal protection cases 
because it does not make individual racial classifications.  For equal protection purposes, 
however, the key difference between Plan 3R and the policies at issue in other equal 
protection cases is not whether Plan 3R makes individual racial classifications as opposed 
to group or neighborhood racial classifications; it is whether Plan 3R makes racial 
classifications or does not.  Our holding addresses whether Plan 3R contains any racial 
classification or does not.  There is no precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court for 
holding that whether strict scrutiny is applied in equal protection challenges alleging 
racial discrimination in education admissions or assignments turns on whether a policy‘s 
racial classification is applied by group or by individual. 
 
35
 Seattle, 551 U.S. at 711–12, 716 (the Supreme Court analyzed the policies of two 
different school districts, one in Seattle, Washington and the other in Jefferson County, 
Kentucky: Seattle School District No. 1‘s assignment policy considered race as one of the 
multiple tiebreaking factors to determine whether to assign a student to an 
―oversubscribed‖ school; Jefferson County Public Schools‘ plan required certain schools 
to maintain black student enrollment between fifteen and fifty percent of the student 
population); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 253–57 (the policy made university admission decisions 
based on points given to applicants for multiple factors, including points awarded to 
applicants in underrepresented ethnic or racial groups, and the policy reserved ―protected 
seats‖ for applicants from ―protected categories,‖ including underrepresented minorities); 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (the policy admitted students based on an evaluation of all the 
information in each student‘s file, which included an essay on how the applicant would 
contribute to the school‘s diversity; reaffirmed the school‘s commitment to diversity with 
special reference to the inclusion of certain racial and ethnic groups; and stated that the 
school wanted to enroll a ―critical mass‖ of underrepresented minority students); Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265 (policy included a special admissions program that considered applicants 
who self-identified as minority group members and admitted a prescribed number of self-
identified minority students each year); Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (policies permitted separate 
schools for black children and white children); McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 638 (policy denied 
admission on the basis of race because state statute criminalized operating, teaching, or 
attending an integrated school); and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (policy restricted 
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those cases, the school district or university policy at issue used racial classifications as 
the sole factor, or as one factor among many, to make determinations regarding student 
school assignments or admission to a higher education institution.   
In Bakke, the Court even noted that the policy ―involves a purposeful, 
acknowledged use of racial criteria.  This is not a situation in which the classification on 
its face is racially neutral, but has a disproportionate racial impact.  In that situation, 
plaintiff must establish an intent to discriminate.‖  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 n.27 (citing 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252; Davis, 426 U.S. 229).   
The facial neutrality of Plan 3R also distinguishes it from the policies in many of 
the Supreme Court race-based equal protection cases upon which Appellants rely in their 
brief —  Adarand, Croson, and Plessy.36  Moreover, in Adarand, the Court emphasized 
that the ―case concerns only classifications based explicitly on race, and presents none of 
the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result in 
                                                                                                                                                             
enrollment to white students, in accordance with state law, and rejected an application 
solely because of the applicant‘s race). 
36
 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213 (policy employed a race-based rebuttable presumption in 
some certification decisions); Croson, 488 U.S. at 477 (policy required certain contractors 
to whom the city awarded construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of 
the dollar amount of the contract to a minority business); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540 (statute 
required that railway companies provide separate accommodations for passengers based 
on race); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, -- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65 (2009) 
(relied upon by Appellants, but Ricci is inapposite because the Supreme Court did ―not 
reach the question whether respondents‘ actions may have violated the Equal Protection 
Clause‖).  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996), and Arlington Heights are the only cases 
upon which Appellants rely in their brief that involve facially race neutral policies or 
laws. 
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racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.‖  
515 U.S. at 213.    
Appellants repeatedly frame the central question in this case as whether ―race was 
a factor,‖ or whether race was considered.  (Appellant‘s Br. at 28, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38.)  
Although Appellants argue that, if race is a factor in a decision, we must apply strict 
scrutiny, counsel for Appellants admitted at oral argument that being aware of or 
considering race when making some decisions can be proper within certain 
circumstances, including doing so to achieve a better racial composition within a school.  
In any event, these arguments are irrelevant to our inquiry.  Appellants and the District 
Court conflate the consideration or awareness of race with (1) racial classifications and 
(2) racially discriminatory purpose.  Equal protection law does not make the same 
conflation.  As a result, both the District Court and Appellants improvidently believed 
that the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply was strict scrutiny.     
The District Court conflated discriminatory purpose with the consideration or 
awareness of race and in doing so stated an incorrect standard for determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny.  The District Court cited the Pryor holding that an action 
adopted because of ―a discriminatory purpose based on race‖ requires strict scrutiny 
analysis.  Pryor, 288 F.3d at 562 (emphasis added).  In restating that holding, however, 
the District Court substituted ―race‖ for ―discriminatory purpose,‖ and incorrectly 
characterized Pryor to hold that, ―once race has been shown to be a motivating factor in 
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decisionmaking, all racial classifications must survive strict scrutiny.‖  (App. at A76 
(emphasis added)). 
A racial classification occurs only when an action ―distributes burdens or benefits 
on the basis of‖ race.  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 720.  In United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 
(1995), the Court noted that the record contained ―evidence tending to show that the 
legislature was aware of the racial composition of [the districts in which the plaintiffs 
lived],‖ but the Court also noted that ―the legislature always is aware of race when it 
draws district lines.‖  Id. at 744 (emphases added) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 
646 (1993) (Shaw I)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  ―That sort of race 
consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination‖ and proof of 
that race consciousness ―in the redistricting process is inadequate to establish injury in 
fact.‖  Id. at 745–46.  Moreover, the Court noted that the justices had ―never held that the 
racial composition of a particular voting district, without more, can violate the 
Constitution.‖  Id. at 746.   
Similarly, the District Court misstated the legal standard for determining the 
appropriate level of scrutiny as described in Arlington Heights because the District Court 
conflated race as a factor with discriminatory purpose.  In Arlington Heights, the 
Supreme Court noted that, ―[w]hen there is a proof that a discriminatory purpose has 
been a motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial deference is no longer justified.‖  
429 U.S. at 265–66 (emphasis added).  The District Court incorrectly stated that 
  
 
41 
Arlington Heights held that such deference is no longer justified when ―race was a 
motivating factor.‖  (App. at A78 (emphasis added).)  Neither Pryor nor Arlington 
Heights stands for the proposition that strict scrutiny must be applied when race, but not a 
discriminatory purpose, was a motivating factor. 
Racially discriminatory purpose means that the decisionmaker adopted the 
challenged action at least partially because the action would benefit or burden an 
identifiable group.  Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 (―discriminatory purpose‖ ―implies that the 
decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 
‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite of,‘‖ the action‘s beneficial or adverse effects ―upon an 
identifiable group‖).  Thus, the mere awareness or consideration of race should not be 
mistaken for racially discriminatory intent or for proof of an equal protection violation.  
Pryor, 288 F.3d at 562 (―A mere awareness of the consequences of an otherwise neutral 
policy will not suffice.‖ (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 277–78)).37 
Appellants also conflate a school assignment policy that explicitly classifies based 
on race with the consideration or awareness of neighborhood racial demographics during 
                                                 
37
 It is also error to treat ―‗racial motive‘ as a synonym for a constitutional violation‖ or 
―racial classification.‖  Raso, 135 F.3d at 16 (holding that an action that is adopted 
because of a ―racial motive‖ or purpose is not ―automatically ‗suspect‘ under the Equal 
Protection Clause‖).  This holds true even for a decisionmaker‘s racially discriminatory 
purpose.  Racially discriminatory purpose, alone, is not a racial classification because 
racial classification is more than a mere thought.  Compare Seattle, 551 U.S. at 720 
(racial classification occurs when an action ―distributes burdens or benefits on the basis 
of‖ race), with discussion of racially discriminatory purpose, infra Part III.A.i.3.b, noting 
that racially discriminatory purpose refers to the purpose or intent in selecting an action 
and not to whether the selected action resulted in actual discrimination or classifications. 
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the development and selection of a policy.  The former is a facially racial policy, such as 
the policies in Seattle, Gratz, Grutter, Bakke, Brown, McLaurin, and Sweatt.  The 
consideration or awareness of race while developing or selecting a policy, however, is not 
in and of itself a racial classification.  Thus, a decisionmaker‘s awareness or 
consideration of race is not racial classification.  Designing a policy ―with racial factors 
in mind‖ does not constitute a racial classification if the policy is facially neutral and is 
administered in a race-neutral fashion.  Hayden, 180 F.3d at 48 (holding that designing a 
policy with a racially discriminatory purpose should not be construed as a facial 
classification when the policy does not explicitly, or in its application, distinguish 
between people on the basis of a protected category). 
When the Supreme Court, in Seattle, Grutter, and Bakke, has referenced applying 
strict scrutiny to a ―plan that uses race as one of many factors,‖ it has meant just that — 
strict scrutiny should be applied to a school admissions or student assignment policy or 
plan that uses race as a factor to determine whether a student is admitted or assigned to a 
school.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339; see also Seattle, 551 U.S. at 793; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
318-19 (Opinion of Powell, J.).  The Court has never held that strict scrutiny should be 
applied to a school plan in which race is not a factor merely because the decisionmakers 
were aware of or considered race when adopting the policy.  When there is no racial 
classification in the plan, strict scrutiny is only applied if plaintiffs show discriminatory 
intent.  
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The first alternative by which intentional discrimination can be shown — racial 
classification — is inapposite to Plan 3R and the facts of this case.  Strict scrutiny 
analysis is not appropriate on this basis.         
b. Intentional Discrimination Shown by Discriminatory 
Application of a Facially Neutral Policy 
 
The second alternative to show intentional discrimination — that a facially neutral 
policy is applied differently on the basis of race — is also inapplicable to Plan 3R.  There 
is no record evidence that the District has applied Plan 3R in a discriminatory manner.  
The Supreme Court first established the standard for this method of proving an Equal 
Protection violation in Yick Wo.  In that case, the city and county of San Francisco 
denied every Chinese laundry owner a permit to operate a laundry business, but denied 
permits for only one of approximately eighty non-Chinese laundry owners.  With that 
example of discriminatory application of a law in mind, to demonstrate that Plan 3R is 
applied differently on a discriminatory basis, Appellants would have needed to show 
below that the District enforces Plan 3R within some areas or regarding some students, 
on the basis of race, while not enforcing Plan 3R within other areas or regarding other 
students.  Appellants have not alleged that Plan 3R is enforced in a disproportionate 
manner. 
c. Intentional Discrimination Shown by Discriminatory 
Purpose for a Facially Neutral Policy 
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To establish government action within the third alternative, a plaintiff is ―required 
to prove that the actions of . . . officials (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose.‖38  Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 
(3d Cir. 2002) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–66 (race discrimination); 
Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–42 (race discrimination); Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 
612, 635–36 (7th Cir. 2001) (race discrimination)).   
i. Discriminatory Impact 
Although disproportionate impact, alone, is not dispositive, a plaintiff must show 
discriminatory impact in order to prove an equal protection violation under this third 
alternative.  ―[N]o case in [the Supreme] Court has held that a legislative act may violate 
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it.‖  Palmer 
v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).  In Palmer, the Supreme Court noted that ―there 
is an element of futility in a judicial attempt to invalidate a law [solely] because of the 
bad motives of its supporters.  If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than 
                                                 
38
 See also Antonelli, 419 F.3d at 274 (holding that, to show an equal protection violation 
when the policy is facially neutral, ―the Appellants would have to show that the 
Appellees acted with discriminatory intent and the [policy] had a discriminatory 
impact‖); cf. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213 (noting that ―this case concerns only 
classifications based explicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties 
posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate 
impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose‖) (citing Arlington 
Heights, 429 U.S. 252; Davis, 426 U.S. 229); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289 n.27 (noting that 
the policy at issue ―involves a purposeful, acknowledged use of racial criteria.  This is not 
a situation in which the classification on its face is racially neutral, but has a 
disproportionate racial impact.  In that situation, plaintiff must establish an intent to 
discriminate.‖) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252; Davis, 426 U.S. 229). 
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because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid as soon as the 
legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.‖  Id. at 225.  
Moreover, discriminatory impact must be shown to establish an equal protection violation 
because ―plaintiffs must show that they have been injured as a result‖ of the 
governmental action to ensure that courts ―can impose a meaningful remedy.‖  Garza v. 
County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990). 
To establish discriminatory impact in a racial discrimination case, Appellants must 
show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were treated differently.  The 
Appellants do not meet this burden.   
Despite Appellants‘ numerous references to the alleged consideration of race by 
Board members and Administrators during discussions of Scenarios and Proposed Plans, 
Appellants have not provided any evidence that Plan 3R treats similarly situated 
individuals of a different race in a different manner.  Along with Students Doe, all white 
students in the Affected Area are also assigned to attend Harriton without the choice to 
attend LMHS unless they live within the LMHS walk zone.  Appellants have not 
provided any evidence that Plan 3R treats black individuals outside of the Affected Area 
in the same way in which it treats Students Doe or other black individuals who live in the 
Affected Area.  North Ardmore, like the Affected Area, has a high percentage of African-
American residents in comparison to other areas.  However, all of the students in North 
Ardmore, both black and white, are assigned to attend LMHS, not Harriton, where 
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Students Doe and Affected Area students are assigned.  Two-thirds of the students 
redistricted to Harriton were students who were not African-Americans and who lived in 
the Affected Area or other areas redistricted to Harriton under plan 3R.
39
  Plan 3R does 
not treat black students in the Affected Area and North Ardmore similarly, nor does it 
treat white students in either area similarly to other white students or differently from the 
black students in the same area.
40
  No evidence has been provided indicating assignments 
based on racial classification here.   
To show a discriminatory impact in the form of a stigma, Appellants would still 
need to demonstrate that they ―are personally denied equal treatment by the challenged 
discriminatory conduct.‖41  Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 
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 See discussion supra Part I.C, noting that, in 2009–2010 under Plan 3R, twenty-one 
students from the Affected Area were redistricted to Harriton, fourteen of whom were 
African-American.  Twenty-three students from areas districted for Penn Valley 
Elementary School were also redistricted to Harriton, none of whom were African-
American.  Less than one-third of the students redistricted were African-Americans from 
the Affected Area.  
 
40
 Cf., Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 797–98 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing 
civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982).  In Brown, we held that Plaintiff 
African-American smokers ―at no place in their submissions . . . argue any disparities . . . 
on the basis of race‖ where Plaintiffs conceded that Philip Morris ―[sold] menthol 
cigarettes to African-Americans at the same price and on the same terms as such products 
are offered to whites‖ and Plaintiffs ―do not allege that the mentholated tobacco products 
sold to African-Americans differ from those sold to whites.‖  Id. 
 
41
 See also Allen, 468 U.S. at 756 (holding that plaintiffs had no standing to challenge 
allegedly racially discriminatory tax exemptions to racially discriminatory schools 
because plaintiffs did not allege that their children had ever applied or would ever apply 
to the discriminatory schools); O‘Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (holding that 
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U.S. 738, 739–40 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, the Court‘s 
discussion of stigma has been in the context of racial classifications.  See generally, 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 507 (2005) (―[a]s we have recognized in the past, 
racial classifications threaten to stigmatize individuals by reason of their membership in a 
racial group‖ (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 643) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  Because Plan 3R includes no racial classifications, arguments regarding 
stigma are of no avail. 
Appellants can also show discriminatory impact by demonstrating that there are 
racial classifications in the school assignment system.  Such classifications force students 
―to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice‖ them.  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 718–
19 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In such circumstances, the discriminatory impact 
―is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier. . . . And in 
the context of a challenge to a set-aside program, the ‗injury in fact‘ is the inability to 
compete on an equal footing in the bidding process.‖  Gratz, 539 U.S. at 262 (quoting Ne. 
Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 
(1993)).  Unlike the systems at issue in Seattle, Plan 3R is not a race-based system and, 
under Plan 3R, there is no possibility that any of the Students Doe will be denied a school 
                                                                                                                                                             
plaintiffs had no standing to challenge racial discrimination in a city‘s criminal justice 
system because plaintiffs had not alleged that they had been or would likely be subject to 
the challenged practices); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding 
that a plaintiff had no standing to challenge a club‘s racially discriminatory membership 
policies because plaintiff had not applied for membership). 
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assignment because of his or her race.  Appellants cannot rely on Seattle, Grutter, Gratz, 
or Bakke to demonstrate discriminatory impact because Plan 3R imposes no racial barrier 
and assigns students on an equal basis — geography. 
ii. Discriminatory Purpose 
  Even if we were to conclude that Appellants have shown discriminatory impact, 
―the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results.‖  Feeney, 442 U.S. 
at 273.  The Supreme Court held in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), that 
―[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause.‖  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.  ―When there is a proof 
that a discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, . . . judicial 
deference is no longer justified‖ and courts should apply strict scrutiny.42  Id. at 266–67.  
However, ―absent a racially discriminatory purpose, explicit or inferable, on the part of 
the [decisionmaker], the statutory distinction is subject only to rational basis review.‖  
Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. 256; Davis, 426 U.S. 229). 
The term ―discriminatory purpose‖ ―implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‗because of,‘ not merely ‗in spite 
of,‖ the action‘s beneficial or adverse effects ―upon an identifiable group.‖43  Feeney, 442 
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 The racially discriminatory purpose need not be the sole or primary factor motivating 
the decision to adopt the challenged action.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
 
43
 See also Antonelli, 419 F.3d at 274 (―the government‘s ‗benign‘ use of racial 
considerations in decision-making . . . is no less subject to strict scrutiny than ‗invidious‘ 
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U.S. at 279.  Racially discriminatory purpose means that the decisionmaker adopted the 
challenged action at least partially because the action would benefit or burden an 
identifiable group.  ―Even conscious awareness on the part of the [decisionmaker] that the 
[policy] will have a racially disparate impact does not invalidate an otherwise valid law, 
so long as that awareness played no causal role‖ in the adoption of the policy.  Frazier, 
981 F.2d at 95 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).        
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court outlined how courts should determine 
whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor.  The determination requires a 
―sensitive inquiry‖ into the available ―circumstantial and direct evidence of intent,‖ 
including: (1) whether the official action has a racially disproportionate impact; (2) the 
historical background of the decision; and (3) the legislative or administrative history of 
the decision.  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266–68.  Proof put forth to demonstrate 
discriminatory intent ―must necessarily usually rely on objective factors.‖  Feeney, 442 
U.S. at 278 n.24.   
If discriminatory impact cannot be ―plausibly explained on a neutral ground, 
impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in fact not 
neutral.‖  Id. at 275.  However, ―[j]ust as there are cases in which impact alone can 
unmask an invidious classification, there are others, in which — notwithstanding impact 
— the legitimate noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed.‖  Id.  As stated above, 
                                                                                                                                                             
use of racial considerations in decision-making‖) (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 493–94; 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226–27).   
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Plan 3R does not have a discriminatory impact.  Even if we were to find that Plan 3R has 
a discriminatory impact, the District has plausibly explained any such impact on a neutral 
ground.  The Board‘s goals in redistricting included the Non-Negotiables of equalizing 
the enrollments of Harriton and LMHS and not increasing the number of buses required.  
The Community Values during redistricting included allowing students who walked to 
school to continue walking to school, minimizing travel-time for bused students, and to 
ensure that children were in comfortable learning environments.   
In addition to these neutral bases for the selection of Plan 3R, the District Court 
noted other race-neutral explanations for the adoption of Plan 3R, including helping 
students attain educational excellence, developing a 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern, and closing the 
achievement gap between students.  Moreover, there is no evidence establishing that the 
District Court clearly erred when it found credible the Board members‘ testimony that 
race was not the basis of their votes for Plan 3R.   
In Feeney, the Supreme Court held that the neutral purposes of a statute, aimed to 
benefit veterans ―provide[d] the surest explanation for its impact‖ benefitting more men 
than women.  Id.  The Court continued, stating that the law could not rationally be 
explained as a pretext for preferring men over women because significant numbers of 
those placed at a disadvantage by the law were men.  Comparably, Plan 3R redistricts to 
Harriton a significant number of students who are not African-American.  Even while 
grandfathering was still in effect, forty-four students were redistricted to Harriton for the 
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2009–2010 school year and thirty of those students, nearly two-thirds, are not African-
American.   
When inquiring into the historical background of the decision to redistrict and 
adopt Plan 3R, there is nothing that sparks suspicion of discriminatory intent and 
Appellants have not alleged otherwise.  The decision to redistrict was born of a capital 
improvement program intended to modernize every school in the district.  Under the plan 
in effect prior to Plan 3R, the enrollment of the District‘s two high schools was very 
uneven (LMHS had roughly twice the number of students that Harriton had) and the 
District was committed to equalizing the two high schools.  The process to select a new 
student assignment plan was carried out over a number of months with the involvement 
of the public. 
To ascertain whether there was discriminatory intent in the development and 
selection of Plan 3R, Appellants and the District Court appear focused on the 
administrative history, especially on statements made by Board members and the 
information included in reports and presentations.  Appellants pay particular attention to 
when racial demographics only or racial demographics in addition to other 
socioeconomic demographics were or were not included in report estimates, slide 
presentations, personal notes, and on the District‘s website.  Awareness of such data or 
omitting such data, however, does not constitute discriminatory intent.  ―[C]onscious 
awareness‖ of a racially disparate impact of a facially neutral policy is irrelevant to equal 
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protection analysis.  See Frazier, 981 F.2d at 95 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279).  
Additionally, the mere awareness of data regarding racial demographics under various 
Scenarios and Proposed Plans is not necessarily awareness of racially disparate impact.  
The racial data showed, under some Scenarios and Proposed Plans, that there would not 
be a racially disparate impact.  For a facially neutral policy, awareness of a racially 
discriminatory impact is only relevant if the policy is adopted at least in part because of a 
racially discriminatory impact.  Id.   
While the statements upon which Appellants rely may indicate awareness or 
consciousness of race, the statements do not constitute discriminatory intent, i.e., that 
Plan 3R was developed or selected because it would assign benefits or burdens on the 
basis of race.  Instead of being adopted for the purpose of discrimination, the statements 
indicate, if anything, that Board members and Administrators adopted Plan 3R in an 
attempt not to discriminate on the basis of race.  Testimony that Scenario 1 was 
eliminated ―due to inequitable racial balancing‖ could indicate that the Administration 
did not want to propose a plan that seemed to treat students differently on the basis of 
race, by having a disproportionate percentage of students of a certain race redistricted.  
(App. at A24.)  Notably, the Administration decided not to formulate any proposed plans 
based on Scenarios 1, 2, or 5.  Scenarios 1 and 2 would redistrict both areas with higher 
African-American populations, the Affected Area and North Ardmore, to attend Harriton 
and Scenario 5 would keep students in both of those areas assigned to LMHS.  Thus, the 
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only Scenarios selected to develop into proposed plans were those that did not treat the 
two areas with the highest African-American populations in the same manner.  Because 
all of the Scenarios assigned students geographically, no Scenario or Proposed Plan 
treated similarly situated African-American students differently from other students.  
Moreover, the District eliminated the Scenarios that arguably treated differently situated 
African-American students similarly, by assigning both areas with higher African-
American populations to the same school.   
Given these circumstances, it is nearly inconceivable that the District intended to 
discriminate on the basis of race.  DiBonaventuro‘s September 2008 email reaffirms the 
anti-discriminatory goals of the redistricting process.  In her email, she stated that the 
Board should emphasize that it is not trying to increase Harriton‘s diversity, but that it, 
instead, is trying to ensure numerically equal total student enrollments at both high 
schools. 
Board and Administrator references to ―diversity‖ do not imply a discriminatory 
purpose.  On the contrary, references to diversity in the context of this facially neutral 
policy implied that decisionmakers did not want the selected plan to have a racially 
disproportionate impact.  Avoiding discriminatory impact seemed to be one of the 
District‘s goals in developing and adopting a plan.  Because the African-American 
students were ―more concentrated‖ geographically, assigning students based on 
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geography could easily lend itself to disproportionate impact unless the Board members 
were aware of the demographics of the areas during the redistricting process. 
In Arlington Heights and Feeney, the Supreme Court found that, despite 
awareness of disparate impact on a group, there was no showing of discriminatory intent 
in the formulation or adoption of the actions at issue.  The Court in Arlington Heights 
held that a zoning decision that bore more heavily on racial minorities was nonetheless 
not adopted due to discriminatory intent because the majority of the statements by the 
decisionmakers focused on neutral factors and the zoning policy had been applied 
consistently.  429 U.S. at 270.   
Similarly, Plan 3R has been applied consistently, regardless of race, and the 
majority of Board members‘ discussions regarding Lower Merion redistricting focused 
on neutral factors: (a) equalizing the populations at the two high schools, (b) minimizing 
travel time and transportation costs, (c) fostering educational continuity, and (d) fostering 
walkability.  Additionally, Plan 3R did not bear more heavily on racial minorities.
44
  
In Feeney, the Court held that there was no discriminatory purpose in the adoption 
of a statute that benefited an overwhelmingly male class — veterans — because the 
benefit was consistently offered to any person who was a veteran, including women.  
Similarly, Plan 3R consistently assigns students, including students who are not African-
American, based on the location of their residence. 
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 Less than one-third of the students redistricted were African-Americans from the 
Affected Area. 
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In Pryor, the Court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged discriminatory 
intent because the complaint and exhibits alleged that the NCAA stated that it adopted a 
policy because ―it believed the adoption of this policy would increase the graduation rates 
of black athletes relative to white athletes.‖  288 F.3d at 564.  The Court noted that the 
complaint did not merely allege that the NCAA was aware of the likely racially 
disproportionate impact; plaintiffs alleged that this discriminatory impact was the 
NCAA‘s ―purpose,‖ ―stated goal,‖ and ―pretext‖ for adopting the policy.  Id. at 564–65.  
In contrast, Appellants have not demonstrated that the District formulated or adopted 
Plan 3R at least partially to benefit or burden African-American students. 
Significantly, the District Court found credible the Board members‘ testimony that 
race was not the basis of their votes for Plan 3R.  We see no evidence of clear error in 
that finding.  If race was not the basis of the Board members‘ votes for Plan 3R, it 
follows logically that they did not vote to adopt Plan 3R for racially discriminatory 
reasons. 
Thus, none of the three alternatives necessary to show intentional discrimination 
and to trigger strict scrutiny is applicable to Plan 3R. 
2. Racially Discriminatory Intent in Electoral Redistricting 
 The District Court held that strict scrutiny was appropriate because it opined that 
the Affected Area was ―targeted‖ for redistricting to Harriton, in part, because it has a 
high concentration of African-American students.  Similarly, our colleague, in her 
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concurrence, concludes that we are required to apply strict scrutiny because, as she notes, 
the racial composition of neighborhoods was considered in determining school 
assignments.  The concurrence suggests a paradigm not present or contemplated in our 
law – be aware of or talk about race and strict scrutiny is triggered.  This theory is 
untenable.  There is no precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court holding that we 
apply strict scrutiny in equal protection challenges alleging racial discrimination in 
education admissions or assignments because decisionmakers were cognizant of the 
racial demographics of neighborhoods when they selected the assignment plan.   
 At oral argument, counsel for Appellants compared Plan 3R to electoral 
redistricting, an area for which the Supreme Court has set out tests for determining 
whether strict scrutiny should be applied to redistricting that involves the consideration of 
racial demographics.  It is not clear that the electoral redistricting precedent controls in 
the educational context, but, even if we were to apply that precedent to the facts in Doe, 
we would still hold that Plan 3R was not developed or adopted for a discriminatory 
purpose and, thus, should not be subjected to strict scrutiny.   
 In equal protection challenges to electoral redistricting, the Supreme Court has 
held that strict scrutiny does not apply to facially race neutral legislation merely because 
(a) ―redistricting is performed with consciousness of race‖ or (b) because there was an 
―intentional creation of majority-minority districts.‖  Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 
(1996).  The Court has held, instead, that, for strict scrutiny to apply to facially race 
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neutral electoral redistricting legislation, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the statutes, 
―although race neutral, are, on their face, ‗unexplainable on grounds other than race,‘‖ 
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643 (quoting Arlington, 429 U.S. at 266) or that (2) ―legitimate 
districting principles were ‗subordinated‘ to race‖ such that ―race must be ‗the 
predominant factor motivating the legislature‘s [redistricting] decision,‖ Vera, 517 U.S. 
at 958–59, or the statute.   
Because Plan 3R is facially race neutral, ―consciousness of race,‖ alone, will not 
require the application of strict scrutiny.  Cf. Vera, 517 U.S at 958 (noting that strict 
scrutiny does not apply ―merely because [electoral] redistricting is performed with 
consciousness of race‖).  Although the Affected Area has the highest concentration of 
African-American students in Lower Merion, that fact does not require strict scrutiny.  
Cf. id. at 958 (noting that strict scrutiny does not ―apply to all cases of intentional 
creation of majority-minority [electoral] districts‖).   
 For strict scrutiny to apply to Plan 3R, the plan would have to be ―unexplainable 
on grounds other than race‖ or it must be shown that other legitimate redistricting 
principles were subordinated to race such that race was the predominant factor motivating 
the District‘s redistricting decision.  Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 643.  Appellants have not cast 
doubt on the proposition that equalizing the student enrollments at the two high schools 
was the primary factor motivating redistricting and the adoption of Plan 3R.  The other 
primary factors motivating the decision included: minimizing travel time and 
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transportation costs, increasing educational continuity such that students who attended 
the same elementary school would stay together through middle school and high school, 
and fostering walkability.   
 As the District Court noted, the decision to adopt Plan 3R is explainable on 
grounds other than race.  Moreover, race was not the predominant factor motivating the 
decision to adopt Plan 3R.  If race had been the predominant factor, the District likely 
would have adopted a plan that: assigned students based on race; moved white students or 
predominantly white neighborhoods to LMHS, while moving African-American students 
or high concentration African-American areas to Harriton without increasing the student 
population at Harriton or decreasing the student population at LMHS; or draw new 
district lines that were not quadrilateral, following major streets and natural boundaries.  
Additionally, race does not explain why the District would adopt Plan 3R instead of 
adopting Plan 1, which would have resulted in African-American students being 9.9% of 
the Harriton student population, or Plan 3, which would have resulted in African-
American students being the same percentage of the Harriton student population as in 
Plan 3R.  Thus, strict scrutiny would not be applied to Plan 3R under the Supreme 
Court‘s electoral redistricting precedent. 
Regarding Plan 3R, there has not been ―proof that a discriminatory purpose has 
been a motivating factor in the decision.‖  Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66.  
Because Plan 3R is ―absent a racially discriminatory purpose, explicit or inferable, on the 
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part of the [decisionmakers], [it] is subject only to rational basis review.‖  Frazier, 981 
F.2d at 95 (citing Feeney, 442 U.S. 256; Davis, 426 U.S. 229).
45
 
ii. Constitutional Analysis 
Under rational basis review, the challenged classification must be upheld if it is 
―rationally related to a legitimate state interest.‖  City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 
297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).  Plan 3R is rationally related to a legitimate interest ―if 
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification.‖  Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting FCC v. 
Beach Commc‘n, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
In determining whether Plan 3R is reasonably related to legitimate state interests, 
our review is highly deferential.  ―[J]udges are not well suited to act as school 
administrators.  Indeed, in the context of school desegregation, this Court has repeatedly 
stressed the importance of acknowledging that local school boards better understand their 
own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the 
educational needs of their pupils.‖  Seattle, 551 U.S. at 848–49 (citing Milliken v. 
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974)). 
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 See also Doe v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 
2008) (―If state action does not burden a fundamental Constitutional right or target a 
suspect class, the ‗challenged classification must be upheld if there is any reasonably 
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.‘‖  
(quoting Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993))). 
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Applying this deferential standard of review, we conclude that Plan 3R is 
rationally related to legitimate government interests.  As noted by the District Court, the 
District presented evidence that Plan 3R is aimed at addressing the following goals: (a) 
equalizing the populations at the two high schools, (b) minimizing travel time and 
transportation costs, (c) fostering educational continuity, and (d) fostering walkability.  
Plan 3R is reasonably related to these four goals.  Equalizing the populations at Harriton 
and LMHS was the impetus for redistricting.  The CAC supported this capital 
improvement proposal because committee members thought that, with equalized high 
school populations, students would benefit from a stronger sense of community, better 
interactions with faculty, and better educational outcomes.  Equalizing student enrollment 
between the two schools required redistricting because, under the prior plan, LMHS had 
700 more students than Harriton.  Under Plan 3R, student enrollment at the two high 
schools is projected, under some estimates, to equalize to a difference of only a handful 
of students. 
The creation of a 3-1-1 Feeder Pattern under Plan 3R is rationally related to the 
Board‘s legitimate goal of ensuring educational continuity.  Administrators and Board 
members testified that aiming to keep students in the same schools as their classmates 
from kindergarten through high school has pedagogical and psychological benefits.  Plan 
3R‘s goal of fostering walkability by restoring the historic LMHS walk zone, which is 
larger than the limited walk zone proposed prior to Plan 3R‘s adoption, is rationally 
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related to a legitimate state interest because it saves the District money that would 
otherwise be needed to cover the cost of buses.  The District has a legitimate interest in 
not increasing its number of buses because doing so would increase costs.  Plan 3R is 
rationally related to this goal because Plan 3R does not increase the number of buses 
required and it also takes into account minimizing travel times.  Additionally, the 
Affected Area is one of the areas closer to Harriton in travel time.  Accordingly, the 
District Court‘s selection of Plan 3R has a rational basis and does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
B. Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981  
Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibitions against discrimination are coextensive 
with those of the Equal Protection Clause.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; Bakke, 438 U.S. 
at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (―Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial 
classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause‖); Gen. Bldg. Contractors 
Ass‘n., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389–91 (1982) (―§ 1981, like the Equal 
Protection Clause, can be violated only by purposeful discrimination‖).  As stated above, 
Plan 3R does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Therefore, Appellants‘ remaining 
claims, pursuant to Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, must also fail.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 343 (holding that, because ―the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the Law 
School‘s narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions[,] . . . petitioner's statutory 
claims based on Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 also fail‖).     
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C. Testimony of Drs. Lyles and Jarvis 
On appeal, Appellants continue to argue that the testimony of Drs. Lyles and 
Jarvis should have been precluded; however, Appellants make no new arguments 
regarding this testimony. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) requires a party, at initial disclosure, to 
provide information for ―each individual likely to have discoverable information — along 
with the subjects of that information — that the disclosing party may use to support its 
claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment.‖  FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(a)(1).  Drs. Lyles and Jarvis did not participate in the redistricting process and, thus, 
they did not have discoverable knowledge regarding the litigation.  Instead, the District 
questioned Drs. Lyles and Jarvis regarding Dr. McGinley and his work on the 
achievement gap.  The District sought to admit this testimony because the doctors had 
worked with Dr. McGinley and had personal knowledge about ―his work concerning 
issues such as the achievement gap, his advocacy for children of color and children with 
disabilities, and his commitment to ensuring greater access to challenging coursework for 
minority students and students with disabilities.‖  (Appellee‘s Br. at 64.)    
The District asserts that it learned about Drs. Lyles and Jarvis on March 11, 2010, 
one day before the deadline for its Pretrial Memorandum.  The District, then, listed the 
two new witnesses in its Pretrial Memorandum.  As the District noted in its reply brief to 
the Appellants‘ Motion in Limine, District Courts have ―allowed parties to call witnesses 
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in rebuttal even when they were not disclosed in a pretrial memorandum or order, as long 
as the witness and his testimony are within the scope of proper rebuttal.‖  (App. at A302 
(citing Upshur v. Shepherd, 538 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).)  The District 
argued that the testimony sought from these witnesses was within the proper scope of a 
rebuttal to the Appellants‘ allegation that the District violated federal law.   
Appellants have not claimed that the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying the motion to preclude testimony, nor does it appear that they could support such 
a claim.  Neither precedent nor any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requires the 
testimony‘s preclusion.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion and we will affirm the denial of Appellants‘ motion.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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STUDENT DOE v. LOWER MERION SCHOOL 
 
No. 10-3824 
          
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 I concur with the result reached by the majority.  I 
would, however, arrive there by a more arduous route.  For 
reasons that I will explain below, I believe that strict scrutiny 
is the test to be applied here.  In addition, I conclude that the 
assignment plan here meets the strict scrutiny test. 
   
 First, I agree with the holding of the District Court:  
Applying strict scrutiny to [the facts of 
this case], the Court concludes that the District 
has satisfied its burden of showing that Plan 3R 
was narrowly tailored to meet numerous race-
neutral compelling interests – namely, having 
two equally sized high schools, minimizing 
travel time and costs, maintaining educational 
continuity, and fostering students’ ability to 
walk to school.  The District’s mere 
consideration of the racial demographics of 
Plaintiffs’ neighborhood does not warrant an 
opposite conclusion under existing Supreme 
Court or Third Circuit precedent. 
 
Because Plan 3R is narrowly tailored to meet the 
school district’s compelling interests, it survives strict 
scrutiny.  In my view, however, there is a problem with my 
conclusion.  I am not happy that the test for reviewing a plan 
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to create diversity in a student body should be strict scrutiny.  
I believe that diversity is a worthy goal for  student 
assignments in a school district.  My concern is that Supreme 
Court precedent, and in particular the decision in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 
1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), does not permit a school district to 
institute a plan to diversify student populations of a school 
district on the basis of race.   
 
In Part III.B of Seattle, Chief Justice Roberts, in his 
plurality opinion, concluded that school attendance plans 
“directed only to racial balance, pure and simple,” are 
illegitimate.  Id. at 726.  The plurality goes on to ask how we 
differentiate between the benefits that flow from racial 
diversity and racial balance pure and simple.  Id.  My concern 
is that we will be unable to do so.  For that reason, any plan 
for student diversity is faced with the threat of being held 
unconstitutional because we cannot compute the difference 
between racial diversity and racial balance. 
 
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, endorses 
diversity as a compelling educational goal.  Id. at 783.  He 
joins in the judgment, however, because the school district 
plans for diversity in Seattle were directed at individual 
students, not at neighborhoods as is the case here.  Id. at 782. 
 
My concern is that the consideration of the racial 
composition of individual neighborhoods to determine school 
assignments may be just as problematic as the consideration 
of the race of individual students.  Plan 3R does involve race:  
not the race of individuals but the racial balance of 
neighborhoods.  An awareness of the racial make-up of the 
neighborhoods is a factor in the assignment plan.  This 
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consideration of the racial composition of neighborhoods is, 
in my opinion, a parallel to the consideration of the race of 
the individual.  It in effect brings consideration of race back 
into the formula.   
 
Moreover, the plaintiffs contend that Plan 3R 
discriminated against them because it mandated their 
attendance at a particular high school on the basis of their 
race.  Although they were not individually assigned to a 
school, the court did find that plaintiffs’ race, through the 
racial composition of their neighborhoods, was a factor that 
was considered in determining their assignments.  
Furthermore, in making the Plan 3R assignments, the School 
District was attempting to improve on the racial diversity of 
its schools through its choice of the areas to be assigned to the 
high schools. 
 
Nevertheless, I am convinced that, although racial 
diversity was an object of Plan 3R, it was not the racial 
composition of the neighborhoods that was the primary 
motive for the new assignment plan.  I agree with the 
conclusion of the District Court, quoted above, that Plan 3R is 
narrowly tailored to meet race-neutral compelling interests 
and that it would have passed without a consideration of the 
racial make-up of the neighborhoods.  All the same, race was 
a factor in the mix and diversity was a goal of Plan 3R.  The 
conclusion I draw is that, when dealing with race-neutral 
compelling interests, the concurrent consideration of racial 
diversity (which of course must be race-based) does not 
invalidate a plan – but we need further guidance from the 
Supreme Court on this issue. 
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Finally, I believe that our decision in Pryor v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Association, 288 F.3d 548 (3d Cir. 2002), 
holding that “a law or policy that purposefully discriminates 
on account of race is presumptively invalid and can survive 
only if it withstands strict scrutiny review,” id. at 566, 
supports my conclusion that strict scrutiny review is required 
here.  Indeed, I believe that this panel should be bound by 
Pryor. 
 
For the above reasons, I agree that we should affirm 
the judgment of the District Court but I conclude that we 
should do so using strict scrutiny review. 
